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IMPLICIT BIAS, ELECTION ‘08, AND THE MYTH OF 
A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 
GREGORY S. PARKS* & JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI**
ABSTRACT
 The election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth President of the United States signals 
that the traditional modes of thinking about race in America are outdated. Commentators 
and pundits have begun to suggest that the election of a black man to the nation's highest 
office means that the United States has entered a post-racial era in which civil rights laws 
are becoming unnecessary. Although President Obama’s election means that explicit, open 
anti-black racism has largely faded, an analysis of the campaign’s rhetoric and themes 
suggests that unconscious racism is alive and well. Rather than suggest a retreat from 
traditional civil rights protections, the 2008 election calls for enhancing and maintaining 
efforts to ensure that civil rights laws address less virulent, but persistent, forms of racism 
that persist in America today.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Barack Obama’s rapid rise in American politics and his ascension 
to the nation’s highest office is historic. Without question, his election 
signals a seismic shift in the way Americans think and talk about 
race. It is a significant leap in America’s long journey towards racial 
equality. Americans on both the political left and right have begun to 
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assert that we now live in a post-racial country.1 If the country has 
entered a new era of race relations, what should become of the laws 
that were created for the era that has supposedly past?  
 For many, the answer to this question is that the laws prohibiting 
discrimination in the workforce and in the electoral processes are no 
longer useful. In the words of Professor Richard Epstein, 
discrimination should now be left to “die on the vine,”2 now that it 
has been deprived of the widespread acquiescence and social support 
that once nourished it. Under this view, the civil rights laws have 
presumably served their purpose in routing out deeply entrenched, 
self-perpetuating bias. Such bias would have kept Barack Obama 
from even attending Harvard Law School, much less running for the 
nation’s highest office. If the barriers that bias creates are 
sufficiently diminished that he can become President, then the civil 
rights laws should arguably conform to the nation’s new reality. A 
postelection survey reveals that Barack Obama’s election to the 
Presidency has led many Americans to assert that racism is less of a 
problem in the United States and that policies designed to address 
racial inequality might now be unnecessary.3
 The wholesale repeal of the civil rights laws hardly seems 
imminent. The current Congress has strengthened Title VII’s 
protection against employment discrimination by extending the 
statute of limitations for such actions.4 This legislation was a 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., which imposed a strict 180-day statute of limitation on 
these actions.5 As Ledbetter demonstrates, judicial rulings provide 
the more likely route by which the rhetoric of a post-racial America 
will have its bite. Even without Congress, the courts can chip away at 
the protections that civil rights laws afford. Two of the Supreme 
Court’s most notable cases in its recent term involved civil rights and 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. Individuals on the political right, such as Ward Connerly and Abigail Thernstrom, 
argue that Barack Obama’s election is a significant step towards a post-racial America. 
Cathy Young, Obama May Boost Foes of Affirmative Action, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, 
at 23. Even those on the political left raise similar prospects. As recent as March 2009, 
with a photograph of President Obama, The American Prospect magazine’s cover story was 
“Post-Racial. Really?: The NAACP Navigates the New Politics of Race.” AM. PROSPECT,
March 2009, at cover; see also Adam Serwer, The Other Black President: The NAACP 
Confronts a New Political—and Racial—Era, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 2009, at 12.  
 2. Debate, Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210 (2009), available at http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf. 
 3. See Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., The Ironic Consequences of Obama’s Election: 
Decreased Support for Social Justice, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 557-58 
(2009) (finding through a longitudinal study that after Obama’s election, “participants . . . 
expressed less support for policies that address injustice such as affirmative action”). 
 4. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).  
 5. 550 U.S. 618, 646 (2007). 
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employment discrimination.6 President Obama’s success creates the 
kind of background that might justify a retrenchment to some 
members of the Court. Furthermore, the fact that a black President 
now governs America will likely influence how district and appellate 
court judges (not to mention jurors) assess such cases.  
 Whether the United States has entered a true post-racial 
environment or not, the era of widespread, explicit bigotry is largely 
over. But we believe that civil rights laws remain essential and, 
ironically, the 2008 election demonstrates why. Contemporary racism 
tends not to take the same overt, virulent forms that it took in 
decades past. Rather, it tends to be subtle—even unconscious.7 Civil 
rights laws and jurisprudence are designed to combat overt 
discrimination but function poorly as remedies for subtle, 
unconscious racism.8 Unfortunately, uncovering convincing evidence 
that unconscious racism influences society at large has proven 
difficult, thereby impeding the drive for making over 
antidiscrimination laws. The 2008 election, however, provides 
evidence for the widespread existence of unconscious racism, as well 
as a case study in how it functions.  
 In this Article, we argue that the 2008 election shows that voting 
rights and employment discrimination laws must continue to 
embrace active, vibrant methods of combating unconscious bias if 
they are to accomplish their stated goals. The principles of open 
access to the polls and workplaces free from discrimination are likely 
to remain enshrined in American law for some time to come. The 
election of a black President, however, might suggest that racial 
gerrymandering has become unnecessary and that efforts to use Title 
VII to combat anything other than overtly racist practices in the 
workplace are unnecessary. We contend that the 2008 election shows 
nothing of the sort. Rather, we argue the 2008 election shows how 
that invigorated versions of these mechanisms are essential to 
combating the implicit racism that continues to influence elections 
and the workplace.  
 To make our case, we use the 2008 election as a case study, 
relying on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.9
                                                                                                                                       
 6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (involving employment discrimination); 
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (involving  
voting rights). 
 7. See infra Section II.A. 
 8. See infra Section II.B. 
 9. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Barack Obama’s Candidacy and the 
Collateral Consequences of the “Politics of Fear,” in BARACK OBAMA AND AFRICAN 
AMERICAN EMPOWERMENT (Manning Marable & Kristen Clarke eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Parks & Rachlinski, Obama’s Candidacy]; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, 
“Eighteen Million Cracks”: Gender’s Role in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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We assess polling numbers, news accounts, and campaign rhetoric to 
contrast the election with the contemporary psychological research 
on how modern racism functions. We then assess what this means for 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  
 At the outset, we note that we are concentrating specifically on 
biases against black Americans, as opposed to other races, and as 
opposed to gender bias. The 2008 election raised some of these issues, 
especially gender, but the use of the Obama campaign as a case study 
means that the clearest observations arise concerning biases against 
black Americans.  
II.   THE 2008 ELECTION AND RACE AT THE BALLOT BOX
 The 2009 “Beer Summit” at the White House with President 
Obama, Professor Henry Louis Gates, and Office James Crowley (the 
Cambridge police officer who had arrested Gates for disorderly 
conduct) surely stands among the oddest examples of what might be 
meant by a “Post-Racial America.”10 In years past, Crowley’s arrest 
might have followed a standard, pessimistic racial script in which a 
racist police force harasses a successful black man. It would have 
produced defensive reactions from police, outrage from the black 
leaders, lawsuits, or even riots. The script today is more complicated. 
Officer Crowley works for a black police chief in a state governed by a 
black governor in a country with a black President. In President 
Obama’s America, the story ends with handshakes over beer in the 
Rose Garden, rather than with litigation and violence. Does a country 
where voters elect black people to high public offices such as police 
chief, Governor, and President really need the protections of the 
Voting Rights Act?
 We doubt that anyone would argue seriously that President 
Obama’s success suggests that efforts to provide equal or widespread 
access to the polls are unnecessary. Elections remain marked by 
unfortunate, sporadic instances of fraud and voter 
disenfranchisement that continue to demand attention at the state 
and federal levels.11 But the Voting Rights Act goes beyond efforts to 
                                                                                                                                       
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297340; Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Richard A. 
Epstein, Debate, Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210 (2009), available at http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. 
Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination 
Through the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Parks & 
Roberson, Michelle Obama].
 10. The “Summit” was widely reported. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Abby Goodnough, 
Over Beers, No Apologies, but Plans to Have Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/us/politics/31obama.html. 
 11. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 11-26 (2009) (giving examples of 
difficulties occurring during elections). 
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ensure access to the polls to all eligible voters. The Act facilitates, 
and even demands, a degree of gerrymandering designed to ensure 
that minority groups, especially black Americans, will find electoral 
success through the creation of districts that are disproportionately 
composed of minorities.12 The wisdom of this kind of racial 
gerrymandering remains the source of heated debate.13 Although it 
allows minority politicians to succeed, it arguably also dilutes the 
influence of minority voters overall by concentrating their interests 
into a few districts.14 The success of black politicians like President 
Obama and Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick arguably 
provides evidence that white voters will vote for minority candidates, 
undermining the foundational assumptions of racial gerrymandering.  
 President Obama and Governor Patrick’s electoral victories, 
however, convey a misleading impression. As we discuss in this 
Section, the success of black politicians has been tied closely to the 
presence of black voters. The 2008 electoral cycle was not 
exceptional. Voting patterns in the United States remain wildly 
racially stratified. Furthermore, as we discuss below, modern 
campaign rhetoric promotes this stratification. Few black politicians 
would enjoy any measure of success without racial gerrymandering. 
In short, President Obama is nearly unique, and it would be 
inappropriate to found changes in election law on his success. 
A.   Black Political Success and Black Voters 
 The success of black politicians has always depended upon the 
franchise and political engagement of black voters. Just after the 
Civil War, Congress’ passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
Enforcement Act, and the Force Act first set black political power in 
motion.15 South Carolina offered an early example of what this large 
and newly motivated black population could accomplish. In 1870, 
black politicians attained three congressional seats, four of the state’s 
eight executive offices, and a seat on the State Supreme Court.16
Throughout the South, black politicians took advantage of the 
political climate of reconstruction to achieve high office, including 
                                                                                                                                       
 12. See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 743 
(2008) (discussing the role of racial gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act). 
 13. See id. at 744. 
 14. See id. at 744-45. 
 15. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR 
VOTING EQUALITY 5 (1992); DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 15 (David A. Schultz, ed., 1998); Sheryll 
D. Cashin, Democracy, Race, and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will the 
Voting Rights Act Ever Be Obsolete?, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 75-76 (2006). 
 16. Cashin, supra note 15, at 76-77. 
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three positions in the United States Senate. By 1875, Congress had 
eight black members.17
 Suffrage proved to be an ephemeral right for black Americans, 
however.18 The end of Reconstruction also signaled the end of 
suffrage for black voters and the demise of black political power. The 
election of 1876 saw the number of black members of Congress drop 
into the single digits.19 It fell to zero by 1902 and stayed there until 
1928.20 The number of black congressional members did not reach 
double digits again until 1969,21 four years after the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act.  
 With the advent of the Voting Rights Act, black political 
participation in elected office again began to grow. Unlike previous 
civil rights legislation, the Voting Rights Act gave the attorney 
general and the courts broad powers to grant relief wherever the 
court found Fifteenth Amendment violations. The Act contained this 
enforcement mechanism “to ensure the administration of a 
discrimination-free electoral process.”22 The Act also established 
“mechanisms or ‘special provisions’ to monitor certain states and 
counties, and it created a triggering mechanism to bring most of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 17. Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and 
Senators, 1870—Present, 44th Congress, 1875-1877, http://baic.house.gov/historical-
data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=44 (last visited July 30, 2010) [he-
reinafter Black Americans, 44th Congress]. There were a total of sixteen black congressmen 
from 1869 to 1877. Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Repre-
sentatives and Senators, 1870—Present, 41st Congress, 1869-1871, http://baic.house.gov/ 
historical-data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=41 (last visited July 30, 
2010); Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and 
Senators, 1870—Present,42nd Congress, 1871-1873, http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/ 
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=42 (last visited July 30, 2010); Black 
Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and Senators, 
1870—Present,43rd Congress, 1873-1875, http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/ 
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=43 (last visited July 30, 2010); Black 
Americans, 44th Congress, supra.
 18. For an account of the multitude of factors that lead to black disenfranchisement, 
see HUDSON, supra note 15, at 7, 16-17; V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND 
NATION 555-643 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28-31 
(2004); Cashin, supra note 15, at 80. 
 19. Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by 
Congress, 1870–Present, 45th Congress, 1877-1879, http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/ 
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=45 (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 20. Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by 
Congress, 1870–Present, 57th Congress, 1901-1903, http://baic.house.gov/historical-
data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=57 (last visited July 30, 2010); 
see Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by Con-
gress, 1870–Present, 71st Congress, 1929-1931, http://baic.house.gov/historical-
data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=71 (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 21. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS: 1870-2008, (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf. 
 22. HUDSON, supra note 15, at 55. 
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South under federal monitoring and the special provisions of 
enforcement.”23 These efforts worked hand-in-hand with voter 
registration campaigns throughout the South to revitalize black 
voters. Renewed participation by black voters, combined with explicit 
racial gerrymandering to produce voting districts with 
disproportionately large black populations, facilitated the election of 
black politicians. Beginning in the 1970s, the number of black 
politicians in former confederate states elected to state and federal 
legislatures grew from less than fifty to more than 100 and reached 
almost 200 by the late 1980s.24 The success of black politicians has 
thus always been tied to the legal protection of black voters. 
 An examination of the 2008 election reveals that the Presidential 
race was a salient anomaly that has not changed the tight 
relationship between black political engagement and the success of 
black politicians. The same election that produced the nation’s first 
black President continued the tradition of overwhelmingly racial 
voting patterns in the national legislature. The demographics of  
the House of Representatives are the product of racial 
gerrymandering and overwhelmingly racially stratified voting. The 
2008 election sent thirty-nine black representatives to the 111th 
Congress.25 Blacks make up, on average, 48.4% of the population in 
these thirty-nine congressional districts.26 In contrast, the 396 other 
districts have populations that are an average of 8.7% black. Even 
these statistics understate the racial divide, however. Among the 
thirty-nine congressional districts that have black populations of  
one-third or more, thirty-two, or 82.1% have black representatives. 
The other 396 districts have only seven, or 1.8%, representatives  
who are black. Only one district (Minnesota’s Fifth, which is 12.7% 
black) has a demographic makeup that is less than the nation- 
wide black population (12.8%) and yet has a black representative. 
Among the 313 districts with smaller black populations, not one has 
a black representative.  
 The demography of congressional districts is no accident. Explicit 
racial gerrymandering is largely responsible for the creation of 
                                                                                                                                       
 23. Id.
 24. Id. at 17 fig.1. 
 25. This information was taken from the website of the Congressional Black Caucus. 
Congressional Black Caucus—Member Information, http://cbc.lee.house.gov/members/ 
officers.shtml (last visited July 30, 2010); see also Black Americans in Congress, Black-American 
Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, 111th Congress, 2009-2011, 
http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=111. 
This number excludes the six non-voting representatives, which include two black members 
from the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. 
 26. The demographic information in this Section, including Table 1, comes from the 
website of United States Census Bureau. U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District 
Data, http://www.census.gov/rdo/data/congressional_district_data.html (last visited July 
30, 2010). 
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thirty-nine congressional districts that have large black populations. 
Because the demographics of the districts vary enormously, even if 
voters select representatives from the population in the district 
without regards to race, some districts would be more likely than 
others to have black representatives. For example, the First 
Congressional District of Illinois (currently represented by former 
Black Panther, Bobby Rush) is 65.1% black. Hence, if race played no 
role in the availability of candidates or the election process, the 
district would have a 65.1% chance of having a black representative. 
At the other end of the scale, only 0.25% of Wisconsin’s Seventh 
Congressional District (currently represented by Dave Obey) is black, 
and hence it would only have a 0.25% chance of having a black 
representative if race played no role.  
 Figure 1, below, demonstrates that the disparities in selection 
cannot be explained by variations in the demographics of the 
congressional districts. This figure breaks the 435 congressional 
districts into ten roughly equal groups,27 ordered by the percentage of 
the district that is black, from highest to lowest. For example, the 
forty-four districts that have the highest percentage of blacks (on the 
left part of the graph), on average, have a black population of 51.1%. 
These forty-four districts are represented by thirty-three black 
representatives (75%), and eleven non-black representatives. As 
Figure 1 shows, black representatives are highly concentrated in the 
districts with the highest concentrations of black voters. Additionally, 
there are no black representatives representing any district in the 
bottom seven deciles of percent of black population, even though 
there remain sizeable numbers of black voters in these districts. 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. To use only even numbers, every other decile, starting with the second, is 43, as 
opposed to 44, districts. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Black Representatives and Percentage of Population that 




































 The racial disparity in this graph cannot be explained by chance.28
The ability of black candidates to get elected to the House of 
Representatives depends entirely on having a large percentage of 
black voters in a congressional district. The statistics even reveal a 
distinct tipping point. Black candidates represent most of the 
districts with a black population greater than one-third; non-black 
candidates represent nearly all of the districts with black populations 
less than one-third. A one-third tipping point is consistent with the 
following simple pattern: black voters nearly unanimously support 
black candidates; half of non-black voters vote nearly unanimously 
against black candidates; and the remaining half of the non-black 
voters divide on political issues. That highly racially stratified voting 
pattern would produce, nearly precisely, the racial composition of the 
House in exactly the same election that produced the nation’s first 
black President. 
 Other factors are also apt to be at work, of course. Incumbency 
matters enormously. In 2008, 378 of the 397 incumbents running for 
re-election, or 95.2%, succeeded (thirty-six incumbents left the 
House, due to retiring, running for other office, or losing the primary 
election).29 Among the black representatives, only William Jefferson 
                                                                                                                                       
 28. If race played no role in voters’ electoral decisions, then we assumed that the per-
centage of the population that is black in the 44 Congressional Districts with the highest 
percentage of black residents (22.48 percent) would produce 10 Representatives who are 
black (.2248 multiplied by 44, rounded off). Likewise, the remaining 391 Districts, which 
consist of 3.45% black residents, should produce 14 black Representatives (.0345 multiplied 
by 391, rounded off). The actual numbers, 33 and 6, respectively, are highly unlikely to be 
achieved by chance. 2(1) = 57.4, p < .001. 
 29. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: U.S. SENATE AND U.S. HOUSE 
RESULTS 79, available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008congresults.pdf (last visited July 
30, 2010); Greg Giroux, Incumbents Defeated in General Elections, 1968-2008, 
http://www.cqpolitics.com/cq-assets/eap/campaigns/girouxgems/DefeatedInGeneralElections.pdf 
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(who was under a federal indictment for bribery)30 of Louisiana lost 
his bid for re-election in 2008.31 But outside of President Obama, 
2008 was no watershed year for black politicians. The election 
maintained a highly stratified status quo.  
 Party matters too, of course. Black voters are easily the 
Democratic Party’s most reliable contingent,32 making race 
impossible to disentangle completely from party. Accounting for 
party thus only redirects the analysis to assessing why black 
candidates succeed overwhelmingly and exclusively in primary 
elections in black districts. Districts that are more than one-third 
black also tend to be dominated by democrats. Due to the fact that 
black voters are overwhelmingly democratic, they make up a 
majority of the voters in the democratic primary elections in these 
districts. If black voters heavily favor black candidates in primary 
elections, then black politicians will theoretically win both the 
primary (due to black favoritism) and the general election (due to the 
dominance of the Democratic Party in that district). Favoritism for 
black candidates might thereby combine with black voter clustering 
in the Democratic Party to explain the extraordinary success of black 
politicians in districts with large numbers of black voters. The 
extraordinary lack of success of black politicians in districts where 
white voters are more prevalent, however, signals that white 
voters—even Democrats—disfavor black candidates.  
 The United State Senate provides the clearest test of the effects of 
racial gerrymandering. Unlike congressional districts, the states are 
not gerrymandered by race. Black politicians seeking to serve in the 
Senate generally face an electorate that has few black voters. Only 
Mississippi has a population that is more than one-third black 
(37.2%).33 Several other Southern states have sizeable black 
populations,34 but the black population in all those states falls below 
                                                                                                                                       
(last visited July 30, 2010); The Cook Political Report, 2008 House Summary, Aug. 21, 2008, 
http://www.cookpolitical.com/charts/house/summary_2008-08-21_13-30-19.php. 
 30. Joel Roberts, Rep. Jefferson Indicted in Bribery Case, CBS NEWS: POLITICS, June 
4, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/04/politics/main2882231.shtml. 
 31. Republican Vietnamese-American Ahn “Joseph” Cao defeated him in the general 
election. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 29, at 113. Ohio’s 11th District changed from 
one black Representative to another, as Marcia Fudge won the seat previously held by the 
late Stephanie Tubbs Jones, who died on August 20, 2008. Id. at 145. 
 32. Rod Young, African American Voting Patterns: Black Voting Demographics 2008 
Democratic Primary Statistics, Aug. 7, 2008, http://racism-politics.suite101.com/article.cfm/ 
african_american_voting_patterns. 
 33. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Mississippi, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 34. For example, Alabama has a black population of 26.4%, Georgia has a black popu-
lation of 30%, Louisiana has a black population of 32%, and South Carolina has a black 
population of 28.5%. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Alabama, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html (last visited July 30, 2010); U.S. Census 
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the one-third cutoff that seems critical to black political success. 
Black politicians do not fare well in Senatorial elections. The only 
sitting black Senator is Roland Burris, who was appointed to serve 
out President Obama’s term in Illinois.35 Furthermore, Barack 
Obama was only the third black politician elected to the Senate in 
America’s history (although two others before Senator Burris have 
been appointed to serve).36 Without the intervention of the Voting 
Rights Act and racial gerrymandering, the House would presumably 
be no different.  
 Despite the legal efforts aimed at ensuring black political 
participation, law alone cannot change human behavior. Brown v. 
Board of Education37 overturned Plessy v. Ferguson’s38 “separate but 
equal” doctrine as it related to public education, but the change in 
law that the decision announced did little to alter the underlying 
attitudes that produced segregation.39 Indeed, widespread 
segregation in schools remains the norm, even fifty years later.40
Likewise, despite the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act and the subsequent rise in the 
number of black elected officials, racism has persisted in the 
American political process. Recent history, too, suggests that political 
candidates’ race has long predicted whether voters would elect them 
to office. Merely protecting access to the polls is not enough to ensure 
black political success. Even in 2008, the active intervention of racial 
gerrymandering remains an essential measure to overcoming racial 
voting patterns. 
B.   Racial Messages in Modern Political Campaigns 
 Why do racial voting patterns persist in an electorate that largely 
denounces the influence of race at the polls? While many factors 
contribute to the persistence of racial voting patterns, political 
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leaders must accept some of the blame. Overt racism is no longer a 
strategy that national leaders employ. Subtle messages that fan 
lingering racial animosity, however, still commonly animate modern 
campaign strategies. Voters’ perceptions about race influence how 
they cast their ballots, and white politicians also have long used 
veiled racism as a way to swing voters or to get white voters out to 
the polls.41
 Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign provided perhaps the first 
blueprint for a modern political campaign in the United States.42
Included in the Nixon campaign’s pioneering efforts in the art of spin 
was the use of racial messages that quietly harnessed the racial 
mood among white voters.43 The campaign promised “law and order,” 
which many saw as code for cracking down on black militants.44 The 
campaign solicited supporters to show up at Nixon rallies to shout 
racial epithets so candidate Nixon could disparage the explicit 
expression of racism.45 This tactic had a double message for white 
voters. To those who disdained explicit racism, Nixon could be seen 
as espousing a reasonably progressive message that racism was 
morally wrong. To those who harbored racist sentiment, the presence 
of the supporter at the campaign was evidence that like-minded 
voters supported Nixon.  
 Many Republicans since Nixon maintained a drumbeat of covert 
racial messages in campaigns. When Ronald Reagan spoke of supposed 
“Welfare Queens” who game the system, voters knew what he meant.46
This latter imagery melded the Republicans’ focus on lower taxes and 
smaller government with whites’ racial animosity. The message to 
whites was implicit but clear: your taxes are high because Lyndon 
Johnson’s programs are funneling your money to undeserving black 
women. These seemingly race-neutral campaign themes, welfare and 
crime, carry demonstrably racially loaded undertones.47
 By the 1980’s, the Republican Party had completely undermined 
the traditional Democratic support among Southern whites and labor 
union members with these kinds of tactics. So successful were these 
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efforts that by 1985, the National Democratic Party openly sponsored 
research to discern why so many working-class white voters had 
abandoned their traditional support for the party.48 After conducting 
significant research on the subject, pollster Stanley Greenberg 
attributed the defection to dissatisfaction with the Democratic 
Party’s increasing association with black voters.49 White defectors 
expressed a profound distaste for black voters and issues important 
to black voters. Their racial sentiments greatly affected how white 
defectors felt about government and politics.50 For these voters, 
blacks constituted an explanation for “almost everything that ha[d] 
gone wrong in their lives.”51 They perceived blacks as a “serious 
obstacle to their personal advancement.”52 Not being black relegated 
them to lower middle-class status. Not living near blacks made their 
neighborhoods decent places to live.53 It is no surprise that such 
voters repudiated the Democratic Party and developed such 
hardened racial attitudes. Just as whites moved to the suburbs to 
flee increasing integration in urban public schools, so too did many 
abandon the increasingly integrated Democratic Party. In effect, 
latent racism combined with the tone of political campaigns to create 
and maintain subtle racially charged voting patterns. 
 As overt racism became increasingly taboo, white politicians 
continued to appeal to white voters’ concerns through subtle 
overtures.54 In 1988, a group that supported George H. W. Bush’s 
presidential campaign ran a highly controversial ad that baited white 
fears about young black male violence. The ads featured a sinister 
image of Willie Horton, a black escapee from Massachusetts who fled 
to Maryland and broke into a white couple’s home. There, Horton 
stabbed the husband and raped the wife. In addition to emphasizing 
Horton’s crimes, the ads also “attacked Democratic presidential 
candidate Michael Dukakis (then governor of Massachusetts) for the 
weekend release program under which Horton had fled the state.”55
Republican political operatives knew that the Horton ad would use 
continuing racism as a way to win white support.56
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 When Jesse Helms, a white Senator from North Carolina, faced a 
black challenger, Harvey Gantt, in 1990, few were surprised that 
race played a role in Helms’ ultimate victory. In the race, Helms 
raised several issues tied to race, including his allegation that Gantt 
favored quotas that would benefit blacks.57 “One of Helms’ 
advertisements showed the hands of a white person crumpling a 
rejection letter. ‘You needed that job,’ the announcer says. ‘And you 
were the best-qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because 
of a racial quota. Is that really fair?’ ”58 The ad was broadcast just a 
few days shy of the election and boosted Helms to victory in an 
election that had been a dead heat.59
 Politicians have even found ways to fan racial animosity even in 
elections between white candidates. During the 2000 presidential 
primaries, Karl Rove masterminded a much-needed victory for 
George W. Bush during his South Carolina primary with a campaign 
that featured a quiet racial attack. Rove strategically used 
“whispered innuendos,” one of them being “that John McCain 
fathered a black child out of wedlock.”60 People in some areas of 
South Carolina received phone calls in which self-proclaimed 
pollsters would ask, “Would you be more likely or less likely to vote 
for John McCain for president if you knew he had fathered an 
illegitimate black child?”61 This was likely a reference to Bridget, a 
darker-skinned child whom the McCains had adopted as a baby from 
an orphanage in Bangladesh.62 “Richard Hand, a professor at Bob 
Jones University, sent an e-mail message to ‘fellow South 
Carolinians’ telling recipients that Mr. McCain had ‘chosen to sire 
children without marriage.’ ”63
 Before the 2008 campaign, the most recent attempt at subtle 
racial appeals in a prominent election occurred during the 2006 U.S. 
Senate race in Tennessee. “[I]n a tight race between Bob Corker 
[white] and Rep. Harold Ford, an African American, the Republican 
National Committee played the race card.”64 A television ad, funded 
by the Republican National Convention (“RNC”), insinuated an 
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intimate relationship between Ford and a white woman.65 The ad’s 
hardest-hitting jab came from the mouth of a scantily clad white 
woman, who says she met Harold “at the Playboy party,” casting a 
flirtatious look into the camera. Then as the ad draws to an end, the 
woman says, “Harold, call me.”66  That dig was meant to remind 
people that Ford attended a 2005 Super Bowl party sponsored by 
Playboy. But it was also meant to suggest that the black 
congressman had gotten too familiar with a white woman.67 Hilary 
Shelton, head of the Washington office of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), said the ad 
“contradicted the spirit of remarks delivered at last year’s NAACP 
convention by the Republican National Committee chairman, Ken 
Mehlman, in which he decried those in his party who had tried to 
‘benefit politically from racial polarization.’ ”68 The NAACP also said 
that the ad played “on fears of interracial relationships to scare some 
white voters in rural Tennessee to oppose . . . Ford.”69
 The continued racial overtones of heated political campaigns have 
likely helped maintain racially stratified voting patterns. Race 
baiting splits white and black voters. The subtle use of racial cues 
capitalizes on lingering racial attitudes to attract white voters. To the 
extent it works, it repels black voters. The contrast of occasional, 
explicit racism exhibited by a fringe candidate or supporter also 
makes the subtler message seem measured and acceptable. The 
political dynamic creates an equilibrium wherein one candidate or 
another will periodically try to attract white voters with racial 
messages that make subtle racism acceptable and widespread in 
political life. 
C.   Racial Messages in the 2008 Presidential Campaign 
 Does the election of Barack Obama change the equilibrium? We 
think not. The 2008 campaign lacked messages as blunt as those in 
the past, but it was not free from racial imagery. An analysis of the 
words, images, and symbols of the campaigns reveals that several 
racial themes emerged, some of which follow the script of racially 
coded messages laid down by past campaigns. These scripts took 
advantage of latent negative associations many white Americans 
harbor towards black Americans just as past campaigns have done.70
Other comments and themes (mostly from supporters or fringe 
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groups) represent explicit racism. We identify and discuss these 
themes below. 
1.   Too Black 
 One early concern about Candidate Obama was that he might be 
“too black.” In the growing body of research on the nature of racial bias 
in American in the twenty-first century, the main finding (which we 
discuss below) is that a large number of white Americans associate 
black Americans with a range of negative concepts.71 The research also 
shows, however, that these negative associations are directed at black 
Americans who appear the most stereotypically black. For example, 
priming police officers with violent imagery causes them to make 
mistakes in a lineup that favor picking out suspects who are rated as 
more “stereotypically Black.”72 Worse yet, juries are more likely to 
sentence black defendants who look more “stereotypically Black” to 
death in capital cases than those who look less stereotypically black in 
cases involving white victims.73 The Clinton campaign, in fact, took the 
obvious tack that this research tone suggests by airing a television 
advertisement that darkened the tone of Senator Obama’s skin, 
thereby making him look more stereotypically black.74 The ad was a 
none-too-subtle effort to make Senator Obama appear more black, and 
(to white Americans) more menacing.75
 Candidate Obama’s opponents also found that events could help 
them move some voters to conclude that Senator Obama seemed too 
black politically. Minister Louis Farrakhan, during the Nation of 
Islam’s Savior’s Day gathering in 2008, publicly praised Senator 
Obama,76 forcing Senator Obama to publicly “reject and denounce” 
Minister Farrakhan’s support.77 Senator Obama’s association with 
Reverend Jeremiah Wright proved to be the best opportunity for the 
Clinton campaign to change the way Americans saw Senator 
Obama.78 Senator Obama was roundly criticized for his long-standing 
relationship with Reverend Wright—whom many white voters and 
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political pundits came to view as racist, militant, and unpatriotic.79
The Clinton campaign needed little help here, as an endless loop of 
sound bites of Reverend Wright’s controversial statements appeared 
on YouTube and cable television.80
 The association with Reverend Wright did real damage to 
Candidate Obama’s campaign. He was forced to respond in a widely 
publicized speech on race in Philadelphia. This speech drew praise 
from many quarters, but it did little to assuage concerns among 
many white voters.81 After the emergence of Reverend Wright, 
Candidate Obama fared poorly among white voters in the remaining 
Democratic primaries, even though he ultimately disavowed 
Reverend Wright. For many white Americans, this association may 
have made him too black to be President. None of the associations 
that some white candidates in both parties have had with radical or 
controversial clergy have hurt their political standing to the extent 
that Obama’s association with Reverend Wright hurt his campaign.82
Reverend Wright is simply too black for white Americans. 
 The McCain campaign chose not to re-raise Reverend Wright in 
the fall campaign.83 Instead, they tried to tie Senator Obama to 
former Weather Underground leader Bill Ayers. Governor Palin was 
the campaign’s primary mouthpiece for this effort, alleging that 
Senator Obama “kicked off his political career, [sic] in the guy’s living 
room.”84 The effort intended to blend two messages—terrorism and 
that Candidate Obama posed a danger to America. The former is a 
throwback to the 2004 Bush campaign’s efforts to appear stronger on 
the terrorism issue than Senator John Kerry. Branding a candidate’s 
policies as dangerous is standard fare, but attempting to make a 
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candidate seem personally dangerous is a novel tactic that plays off 
of latent associations that most white Americans harbor between 
black Americans and violence.  
2.   Primate Imagery 
 One of the ugliest aspects of the 2008 presidential campaign 
included several incidents where voters likened the Obama’s to 
various types of primates. First, in February 2008, one commenter on 
The Huffington Post indicated that Ms. Obama was reminiscent of 
Zira—one of the characters from Planet of the Apes.85 Three months 
later, a white Georgia bar and grill owner began selling T-shirts at 
his establishment depicting the image of Curious George, a cartoon 
monkey, with the slogan “Obama in ‘08.”86 Then in June, a Utah 
company began making a sock monkey (doll) of Senator Obama.87
 These efforts arise from the latent associations many white 
Americans harbor between blacks and apes. In one study of this 
relationship, individuals were subliminally shown images of black 
faces, white faces, or neutral images.88  Then they were shown fuzzy 
images of animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became 
clearer. Individuals were instructed to indicate the point at which 
they could identify the image. Individuals more easily identified ape 
images when primed (subliminally shown images) with black male 
faces than when not so primed. Moreover, individuals found it more 
difficult to identify ape images when primed with white male faces.89
In a second study, individuals primed with images of apes more 
closely attended to black faces than white faces, as compared to those 
individuals primed with jumbled line drawings.90 Another study 
showed that white males implicitly associate African Americans with 
apes, as opposed to cats and other animals, even though these 
participants denied awareness of the stereotype “African Americans 
are like apes.”91 The results suggest that although the black-primate 
association is common, it may operate outside of “explicit cultural 
knowledge of the association.”92
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 The major candidates and their principal surrogates avoided 
making these associations during the campaign, as did the news 
media. Even after the election, however, the New York Post 
published a cartoon portraying President Obama as an ape.93
3.   Slurs 
 The 2008 Presidential campaign also featured patently racially 
derogatory terms and quasi-derogatory terms to describe candidate 
Obama when viewed through a racial lens. Accordingly, white 
politicians’ use of implicit anti-black bias predicts the use of  
racial slurs.94
 Early in the campaign, Hillary Clinton’s surrogate, Andrew 
Cuomo, used the phrase “shuck and jive” to describe how candidates 
evade questions from the press. Though he did not mention Obama 
by name, many believed he was referring to Obama.95 Additionally, 
Republican Congressman Tom Davis, in discussing how Senator 
Obama would have difficulty handling the immigration debate, 
described this issue as a “tar baby.”96 Arguably, Representative 
Davis’ statement was not racially tinged, although he has a history of 
making similar statements.97
 Obama also received a considerable amount of criticism after he 
referenced some working-class voters’ frustration with the economy. 
He noted, “[i]t’s not surprising, then, they get bitter, they cling to guns 
or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-
immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their 
frustrations.”98 Senator Clinton used this statement to charge Senator 
Obama with being elitist.99 What was striking about such a critique is 
that Senator Obama was raised in poverty by a single mother and then 
by his grandparents. And despite his Columbia University and 
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Harvard Law degree, he and his wife had just paid off their student 
loans relatively close to when he decided to run for the Presidency.100
This is in contrast to Senator Clinton (wife of a former President, Ivy 
League educated, and multimillionaire)101 and Senator McCain 
(husband of a multimillionaire and son of a Navy Admiral).102
Although the attack was arguably an effort to paint Senator Obama as 
a Northeastern, ivory-tower liberal, it had other connotations given the 
historic tendency among some white Americans to react negatively to 
someone they consider an “uppity nigger.” Indeed, Obama was the only 
presidential candidate openly criticized as “uppity.”103   
 Fringe groups also used a number of demeaning racial slurs 
during the campaign. Near the end of the presidential campaign, the 
Chaffey Community Republican Women, Federated sent out a 
newsletter that depicted Barack Obama on a $10.00 “food stamp.” 
Also on the food stamp was a bucket of KFC fried chicken, a piece of 
watermelon, spare ribs, and a pitcher of Kool-Aid.104 The group’s 
president, Diane Fedele, indicated that she had no idea why anyone 
would take offense to the image, stating “[i]t was just food to me. It 
didn’t mean anything else.”105
4.   Foreign, Arab/Muslim 
 Candidate Obama continuously faced allegations that that he was 
unpatriotic, un-American, and even a foreigner. These allegations 
started early when he was criticized in the primaries based on false 
allegations that he does not pledge allegiance to the American flag. 
Such critiques stemmed from him not placing his hand over his heart 
during the singing of the national anthem at an Iowa fair.106 In 
addition, critics latched onto the fact that Obama had stopped 
wearing an American flag pin on his lapel, despite arguing that he 
believed some politicians used the flag pin as a hollow substitute for 
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patriotic deeds.107 Because of such actions, critics—often white 
voters—labeled Senator Obama as unpatriotic.108 By the time of the 
Democratic National Convention, the Obama campaign seemed to 
have concluded that a cold intellectual description of why he was not 
wearing a flag was unwise and duly surrounded him with as many 
American flags as would fit on every stage he entered.  
 Candidate Obama’s name, of course, made him vulnerable to 
allusions of foreign loyalties or status, but his race also played a role 
in this vulnerability. Many white Americans continue to associate 
racial minorities with disloyalty. As recently as twenty years ago, a 
poll indicated that 51% of non-black Americans believed that black 
Americans are less patriotic than other racial groups.109 Such 
attitudes remain pervasive at the unconscious level. In one recent 
study, researchers found that college students more easily paired 
American symbols with white faces rather than with black faces.110 In 
another study, white and Asian Americans associated whites with 
the “American” concept to a greater extent than blacks.111 Yet 
another study showed that people associated eight white American 
Olympic athletes more strongly with the category “American” than 
eight black American Olympic athletes (even though the subjects in 
the study were more familiar with the black athletes than the white 
athletes).112 Furthermore, when whites and Asians are primed (where 
individuals are subliminally shown images) with the American flag, 
their attitudes toward black Americans become more negative.113
When whites and Asians are primed with images of the American 
flag, their attitudes toward Democrats were not altered, but their 
attitudes toward blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically, 
became more negative.114 A study conducted in December 2007 
showed that people more easily associated Senator Clinton with the 
category “American” than Senator Obama.115 That study also showed 
that participants explicitly found Barack Obama more American 
than Tony Blair. However, implicitly, the participants more strongly 
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associated pictures of white politicians with the “American” concept 
than pictures of black politicians.116
 In addition to equating Obama’s race with a lack of being 
authentically American, critics have attempted to allude to his 
middle name, Hussein, as another indicator that he is not 
authentically American. Bill Cunningham, a conservative radio show 
host and supporter of Senator McCain, revved-up a crowd before 
Senator McCain’s appearance at a political rally by repeatedly 
referred to Obama as “Barack Hussein Obama,” emphasizing his 
middle name. 117 At a rally late in the campaign, an elderly McCain 
supporter openly called Obama “an Arab.”118 Senator McCain 
repudiated both of these remarks,119 but the events were reminiscent 
of the Nixon campaign’s tactics. Although there is no evidence that 
the McCain campaign scripted the event—and Senator McCain’s 
rebukes seemed entirely sincere—these comments might have 
reinforced the notion that Senator Obama was simply less American 
than Senator McCain. 
 The latent sense that Barack Obama is not quite American has 
not entirely dissipated with his election. In the summer of 2009, CNN 
reporter Lou Dobbs began publicly questioning President Obama’s 
citizenship.120 Dobbs is the most visible, mainstream source of this 
rhetoric. The “Birthers,” radical conservatives who seek to prove 
Barack Obama is ineligible to hold the office of President,121 began 
appearing at town hall meetings of members of both parties during 
2009, demanding an investigation into President Obama’s 
citizenship.122 Health care protests during 2009 also focused on a 
theme of “taking back America.” Rhetoric demanding that politicians 
“take back our country” is not unique to President Obama—President 
Bush attracted similar calls.123 Past demands to “take back America,” 
however, have not been accompanied either by the emotional anger 
that characterized many rallies this summer or by charges that the 
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President is not a citizen. Just as black American Olympic athletes, 
decked out in red, white, and blue uniforms, seem less American to 
some than their white counterparts, apparently so too does a black 
American President seem less American than his predecessors.  
5.   Interracial Taboo 
 Arguably, the most successful racial subtext that the McCain 
campaign used was that of the interracial sexual taboo. In August of 
2008, the McCain campaign ran an advertisement designed to use 
Senator Obama’s growing celebrity status against him. The 
advertisement called him “the world’s biggest celebrity” and featured 
Paris Hilton and Britney Spears. The ostensible point of using these 
two particular celebrities was to suggest they are vacuous, troubled 
party girls, illustrating the idea that celebrity status does not equate 
to the leadership skills needed to govern.124 But the world of 
celebrities is filled with people who doubtless lack qualifications to 
run the country. The use of these two blond, white women arguably 
amounted to race-baiting. As one critic of the advertisement put it, 
using Paris Hilton and Britney Spears “subliminally played on white 
America’s fear of black men violating the delicate flowers of white 
American womanhood.”125
 Shortly after the advertisement began airing, Senator Obama 
began to drop in the polls. By the end of August, Senator McCain had 
erased Senator Obama’s large lead, and the campaign was too close 
to call.126 What role the Hilton-Spears ad played in this is impossible 
to say with certainty. The same month included the conventions and 
the surprise announcement that Governor Palin would be Senator 
McCain’s running mate. The interracial taboo remains powerful, 
however, and cannot not easily be dismissed as a partial explanation 
for the tightening of the electoral race during this period. As noted 
above, the taboo was successfully used in the 2006 Tennessee Senate 
race against Harold Ford. Although the fall campaign was generally 
free of racial subtext, it seems unlikely that the McCain campaign 
chose these two celebrities at random. 
D.   Conclusion 
 The creation of “minority” congressional districts is one of the 
most controversial components of the Voting Rights Act. These 
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districts dilute the influence of minority voters by concentrating 
them in a handful of districts, thereby allowing other representatives 
to ignore the concerns of minorities. The application of the Voting 
Rights Act to gerrymandering allows an unfortunate, heavy-handed 
federal intrusion on a process that is historically local. The role of the 
courts in reviewing these districts also uncomfortably entangles 
judges in the political process. Weighed against these costs is the 
concern that absent racial gerrymandering, minority politicians 
would never achieve elected office. The election of Barack Obama to 
the nation’s highest office thus undermines a foundational 
assumption of racial gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act. 
 An assessment of the 2008 election reveals that race continues to 
play an enormous, albeit subtle, role in elections. Racially stratified 
voting is pervasive. The same election that produced a black 
President also witnessed the election of 39 black representatives, 
almost all of whom come from districts that are more than one-third 
black. Absent racial gerrymandering, the House would likely look 
like the Senate, which now lacks even one elected black member. 
Furthermore, the 2008 election continued a modern tradition of 
racial subtext that promotes racially stratified voting. The 
Presidential election itself included several explicitly racist 
intrusions by fringe groups and sub-textual references by Candidate 
Obama’s chief opponents. A full analysis of the 2008 election thus 
shows that it cannot support the end of racial gerrymandering. 
Limiting the Voting Rights Act to the protection of access to the polls 
so as to ensure equal access would effectively end the careers of many 
minority politicians. Many white voters happily voted for Barack 
Obama. An assessment of the national legislature, however, suggests 
that, like most Presidential candidates, he is an extraordinary 
outlier, rather than the tip of a larger iceberg of post-racial elections.  
III.   THE 2008 ELECTION AND THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS IN 
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
 It comes as little surprise that the 2008 election holds lessons for 
the electoral process—it was an election after all. The election also 
has some surprising lessons for how employment discrimination 
functions. The election of the President of the United States is 
undoubtedly the longest and most public job interview imaginable.127
As such, it provides an unusual case study of how racial 
discrimination functions in the employment process.  
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 As with voting rights, the 2008 election arguably provides 
superficial support for pulling back the reins on active legal 
intervention to prevent discrimination. President Obama’s success 
shows that the influence of explicit racism on employment has 
diminished enormously. This comes as old news to employment 
discrimination legal scholars who have long argued that Title VII’s 
protections should be redirected toward eliminating the more 
pervasive influence of unconscious or implicit racial biases.128 The 
influence of unconscious bias is necessarily more difficult to identify 
than explicit racism, thereby making it hard for reformers to argue 
that Title VII jurisprudence needs to be extended to address such 
biases. We contend that the 2008 election, paradoxically, provides 
evidence that unconscious or implicit bias influences hiring decisions. 
A broad look at the Obama campaign underscores the influence of 
race on the 2008 election. To land the job of President, Obama had to 
walk a veritable racial tightrope—building black support while not 
alienating white voters.129 He had to navigate a minefield of 
unconscious racial biases, just as any black job candidate would. 
A.   The Science of Implicit Racial Bias 
 Research on “implicit bias” demonstrates that race influences 
unconscious cognitive and emotional reactions, wholly outside of 
conscious, rational awareness.130 Psychologists term these 
unconscious, emotional influences “implicit biases”—attitudes or 
thoughts that people hold but might not explicitly endorse.131 These 
attitudes commonly conflict with expressly held values or beliefs, as 
demonstrated clearly by the December 2007 study we discussed 
above, showing conflicts between the participants’ explicit and 
implicit beliefs about whether Barack Obama or Tony Blair is more 
American.132 Participants in that study knew, at a conscious level, 
that Tony Blair is a British politician and Barack Obama is an 
American. But their minds held internal associations that more 
closely associated Tony Blair, particularly his ethnicity, with 
characteristics that they think of as quintessentially American.  
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 Many people who embrace the egalitarian norm that skin color 
should not affect their judgment of a job or political candidate also 
unwittingly harbor negative associations with minorities.133 People 
might not even be aware that they hold these attitudes.134 Even so, 
these implicit cognitions influence how people evaluate others.135 The 
implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence the final choice  
of a voter who does not otherwise clearly embrace one candidate  
over another.136   
 Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to 
measure these implicit cognitions. These measures have proven to be 
particularly useful for studying bias against blacks for two key reasons.  
The first is that when explicit measures are used, individuals may 
not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because of social 
desirability biases, thus attenuating the magnitude of the 
relationship that researchers identify between attitudes and 
political outcomes. A second comparative advantage of implicit 
measures is that individuals may not even be aware of their true 
preferences or attitudes.137
 The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has rapidly become the most 
widely used measure of implicit racial bias.138 The IAT basically 
measures the relative strength of associations between pairs of 
concepts. It does so with a simple computer task that asks 
participants to sort stimuli into one of four categories. The four 
categories are also paired together, so that the difficulty of the 
sorting process produces a measure of how closely the person taking 
the IAT associates the categories.139 For example, one of the most 
common IAT tests asks participants to sort positive words, negative 
words, black faces, and white faces. The task pairs white faces with 
positive words and black faces with negative words and measures 
how long it takes participants to sort randomly presented stimuli. 
Then it alters the pairings to be white faces with negative words and 
black faces with positive words, and again measures the time it takes 
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participants to sort the four types of stimuli. The difference in 
average reaction times in the two different pairings provides a 
measure of the participant’s association between the two categories 
(white with good and black with bad versus white with bad and black 
with good).140
  IAT studies reveal that a majority of Americans more closely 
associate black faces with weapons and white faces with harmless 
objects than the opposite pairing.141 Additionally, participants 
identified weapons faster when primed with black faces than white 
faces.142 The proper interpretation of these results has been a matter 
of some debate,143 but most scholars conclude that the IAT can 
measure invidious implicit biases.144 Furthermore, the bias begins at 
an early age. Baron and Banaji assessed white American six-year-
olds, ten-year-olds, and adults using a child-oriented version of the 
IAT. Remarkably, even the youngest group showed implicit pro-
white/anti-black bias, with self-reported attitudes revealing biases in 
the same direction. The ten-year olds and adults showed the same 
magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial attitudes 
became substantially less biased in older children and vanished 
entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable attitudes 
toward whites and blacks.145 It seems that people learn bias early but 
only later learn to cover the bias by publicly embracing more 
egalitarian norms. 
 The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit 
attitudes towards race and measures of implicit bias.146 Although 
explicit and implicit measures of bias are related, even people who 
openly embrace egalitarian norms often harbor very negative 
associations concerning blacks.147 Even participants who are told that 
the IAT measures undesirable racist attitudes and who explicitly 
self-report egalitarian attitudes find it difficult to control their biased 
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responses.148 These findings suggest that the explicit and implicit 
studies measure somewhat different cognitive systems. The explicit 
measures show that most adults have learned the importance of 
egalitarian norms, or at least the importance of embracing such 
norms publicly. These explicit norms, however, reflect only the slower 
deductive processes. 
 Implicit racial bias is not a mere abstraction. It is linked to the 
deepest recesses of the mind—particularly the amygdala. The 
amygdala is an almond-sized subcortical brain structure, involved in 
emotional learning, perceiving novel or threatening stimuli,149 and 
fear conditioning.150 Neurological research shows that whites react  
to black faces with amygdala activation, even when shown black 
faces subliminally.151 This activation does not occur in whites 
processing white faces. Furthermore, the degree of amygdala 
activation after exposure to black faces correlates with IAT scores.152
In short, whites who show evidence of a high degree of implicit bias 
react to black faces, whether they know it or not, with some measure 
of fear and anxiety. 
 The unconscious bias that the IAT measures also seems to affect 
cognitive processes. In one study, subliminally priming participants 
with the word “white” made it easier for them to recognize positive 
words like “smart” than when they were primed with the word 
“black.”153 Other studies show even more marked effects when 
researchers use black and white faces as priming materials.154
Similarly, whites subliminally primed with black male faces reacted 
to a staged computer mishap with much greater hostility than those 
primed with white male faces.155 Other work shows that subliminally 
priming people with words commonly associated with blacks could 
lead individuals to interpret ambiguous behavior as more 
aggressive.156 Consistent with the findings of the IAT, the 
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associations most people have with blacks are different from those 
they have with whites. Exposure to black faces, even at a subliminal 
level, activates both the category “African American” and the 
associated stereotypes and behaviors that go along with it. In turn, 
white individuals seem simply to think differently, at least at an 
intuitive level, about blacks than about whites.  
 Other striking demonstrations of the influence of unconscious 
racial bias on behavior show that these biases can be life-
threatening. One study placed participants in a video game style 
police simulation in which they had to assess whether a target was 
holding a gun or a harmless object (wallet, soda can, or cell phone).157
Participants had to decide as quickly as possible whether to shoot the 
target. Both black and white participants were more likely to 
mistake a black target as armed when he in fact was unarmed; 
conversely, they were more likely to mistake a white target as 
unarmed when he in fact was armed.158 Furthermore, unconscious 
anti-black bias correlated with the extent of this shooter bias.159 In 
the area of health care, Green and his colleagues found that the 
diagnoses of internal medicine and emergency medicine physicians 
were associated with their unconscious bias.160 In that study, those 
physicians who harbored implicit negative associations with black 
patients diagnosed black patients differently than white patients.161
B.   Implicit Bias and Title VII 
 As the moniker implies, implicit bias is bias; it puts a thumb on 
the scale against its targets.162 Although Title VII was passed to 
eliminate racial bias from employment decisions, it is challenging to 
use a legal remedy to address an implicit bias of which employers 
themselves might lack awareness. Although courts can detect the 
influence of implicit bias in some ways, legal scholars have argued for 
some time now that the current jurisprudence is not well suited for 
eliminating the influence of implicit bias from the workplace.  
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 Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate against 
applicants or employees on the basis of a number of categories, 
including race and color.163 Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
a complainant establishes a prima facie case for racial discrimination 
where he shows:  
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and 
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant’s qualifications.164
The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate a valid 
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee.165 An employer 
cannot, however, use the complainant’s conduct as a pretext for the 
discrimination, nor may it engage in racial double standards.166 In 
turn, the employee must “demonstrate that the proffered reason was 
not the true reason for the employment decision.”167 This may be done 
directly by demonstrating that “a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s 
proffered explanation” is not credible.168
 This framework is not ideally suited to identifying the influence of 
implicit bias.169 It can identify explicit, conscious biases and animus 
much more easily than addressing biases people are not consciously 
aware they harbor.170 People who hold overtly racist sentiments often 
say as much in public ways. A police chief who says he does not 
believe women make good officers or a human resources director who 
states that she worries about hiring blacks because she thinks they 
are lazy make easy targets for the law’s prohibition against 
discriminatory hiring practices.171 Such individuals commonly try to 
hide these sentiments, particularly in litigation, but it is easy for 
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these people to slip up. Litigation might ultimately reveal the 
discrimination in some way—perhaps through the discovery of casual 
comments in depositions or through the identification of confidential 
memoranda through document production. The reliance on 
unconvincing pretexts that are easily identified might also be 
common in those who deliberately discriminate.  
 Unconscious bias, however, is difficult to detect. People who hold 
implicit biases against women or blacks are not necessarily aware of 
these biases. People’s reports of their cognitive processes are often 
not consistent with their judgments.172 Many influences on judgment 
seem to operate outside of people’s awareness.173 Combining this 
observation with contemporary research on the structure of the 
brain, psychologists now argue that people rely on two distinct 
cognitive systems of judgment: one that is rapid, intuitive, and 
unconscious; another that is slow, deductive, and deliberative.174 The 
intuitive system can often dictate choice, while the deductive system 
lags behind, struggling to produce reasons for a choice that comports 
with the accessible parts of memory. Thus, an intuitive gut reaction 
against a job candidate can dictate a hiring decision. The rational 
account only follows later and might not provide a fully accurate 
account of the decision. People who harbor negative implicit 
associations with black job applicants might assess resumes of 
women or blacks more harshly than those of white males without 
even being aware of what they are doing. Although 
antidiscrimination laws ban the influence of race or gender in hiring 
decisions regardless of the source of such influence, unconscious bias 
can escape scrutiny.  
 Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger identified the role that 
unconscious bias might play in employment discrimination almost a 
decade and a half ago. Kreiger argued that most modern stereotyping 
arises from “cognitive structures and processes involved in 
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves 
result in stereotyping and other forms of biased intergroup judgment 
previously attributed to motivational processes.”175 Furthermore, it is 
not only “bad” people who stereotype; as part of “normal cognitive 
functioning,” all people categorize and stereotype natural objects as a 
way “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining 
information about people in memory.”176 These stereotypes 
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unintentionally bias people’s judgment about members of other 
groups and operate outside of one’s own conscious awareness.177
Although her work predated the development of the IAT, it presaged 
the science that followed. 
 The existing Title VII framework does not easily square with the 
view that bias arises from unconscious cognitive processes. The 
courts generally assume that unless employers harbor discriminatory 
intent or motive, they will not discriminate.178 As such, proving 
discriminatory intent in the employment context is a high hurdle to 
overcome.179 Under the analytical framework established by Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, proof of disparate treatment is evinced by three 
steps.180 First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff presents a 
prima facie case of discrimination.181 In response, the defendant has 
the burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its 
decision to engage in the action at issue as it pertains to the 
plaintiff.182 Second, the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the 
defendant’s proffered reason was not the “true reason[]” for the 
decision,183 but merely a “pretext for discrimination.”184 According to 
Krieger’s research:  
The most common method of proving pretext is to show that the 
employer’s proffered reason is not worthy of credence either 
because it appears implausible in light of data upon which such an 
employment decision should have been based, or because it 
appears inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases 
involving employees outside of plaintiff’s protected class.185
 This framework fails to account for the fact that race and sex 
categorization “may distort perception, memory, and recall for 
decision-relevant events such that, at the moment of decision, an 
employer may be entirely unaware of the effect of an employee’s group 
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membership on the decisionmaking process.”186 In essence, according 
to Kreiger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly 
construes how discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental 
strategies that employers use in decisionmaking. This occurs in three 
ways. First, it assumes that discrimination occurs when a 
decisionmaker refuses to consider an individual for a particular 
position. Furthermore, it assumes that the decision arises out of 
antipathy for that individual’s social group or because placing the 
individual in the position in question violates role expectations for 
members of the individual’s social group.187 Second, disparate 
treatment jurisprudence assumes that “stereotypes can cause 
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a ‘proxy’ for 
some other job-relevant trait.”188 Third, it assumes that discrimination 
occurs at the precise moment of the employer’s decisionmaking.189
 The disparate treatment jurisprudence also mistakenly assumes 
that decisionmakers possess adequate access to their own thoughts 
as to why they will make, or have made, certain decisions.190 As such, 
it assumes that decisionmakers are aware of the reasons why they 
will make, or have made, employment decisions.191 With such 
knowledge, well-intentioned decisionmakers comply with Title VII.192
In contrast, decisionmakers with bad intentions know when they are 
taking an employee’s group status into account; when challenged, 
they design pretexts to cover their tracks.193
 Oddly enough, the human brain excels at creating pretext to cover 
the role of unconscious motives.194 The brain commonly reacts with 
an intuitive judgment, which the rational side must then explain, 
almost as if the behavior were the product of external events. Thus, 
in one unusual study where researchers gave subjects the somewhat 
embarrassing task of picking out their favorite piece of lingerie, 
participants tended to select the third choice, regardless of the 
available options.195 When asked to explain their choice (an even 
more embarrassing chore than selecting the favorite), subjects never 
stated that they had simply selected the third option so as to avoid 
having to think about the task, even though that was likely what 
they were doing. They found some explanation, however silly, and 
settled upon it. Similarly, in a study in which the researchers subtly 
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manipulated subjects’ willingness to tolerate electric shocks, subjects 
invented explanations to account for their tolerance of the pain.196
Even though a placebo pill was responsible for the tolerance, subjects 
said things such as “I used to build radios and stuff when I was 13 or 
14, and maybe I got used to electric shock.”197 The placebo pill 
unconsciously influenced their tolerance, but the rational side of the 
brain supplied an explanation. The brain’s ability to rationalize and 
hide intuition is so profound that psychologists argue that the human 
system of moral reasoning is founded entirely on intuition, even 
though philosophers (and lawyers) treat it as highly rational, 
coherent, and conscious.198
 The rationalization of intuitive judgment seems to work well in 
the employment context, at least in experimental settings. 
Researchers have found that subjects selecting among resumes 
adjust their rationalizations in ways that can accommodate bias. For 
example, when the resume of a white job candidate showed more 
experience than that of a black candidate, subjects emphasized the 
importance of experience for the job; when the reverse was true they 
claimed experience was not important.199 The rational, conscious side 
of the brain seems geared to cover the potentially embarrassing 
choices that the intuitive side might make. This tendency makes 
ferreting out the influence of unconscious bias difficult. 
 Nevertheless, some courts have tried to recognize the influence of 
unconscious bias in employment discrimination suits. Courts have 
refused to grant defendant-employers summary judgment in Title VII 
cases given employers’ “hidden or unconscious [discriminatory] 
motives.”200 In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted the following: 
Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenomenon . 
. . . It is intentional discrimination in its covert hidden form that 
now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit intent may be 
extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible individuals 
are conscious of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or 
whether they are expressing unconscious bias through some 
discretionary decisionmaking process.201
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 Some courts have even stated that Title VII forbids unconscious 
race bias,202 even though existing jurisprudence generally does not 
accommodate such claims. Recognition of the role of unconscious bias 
in employment discrimination would lead courts to be more skeptical 
about pretext and to attend more closely to the context and 
environment in which the bias allegedly operates. The election of a 
black President, however, would suggest the opposite—that courts 
embrace the notion that we have entered a post-racial period in 
which claims of bias should be taken more skeptically. In the next 
Section, we argue that the 2008 campaign refutes the latter idea. 
C.   Implicit Bias and the Obama Campaign 
 A key impediment to convincing courts that they need to recognize 
the potential for unconscious bias in Title VII claims is a lack of 
direct evidence that unconscious bias implicates employment 
decisions outside of the context of psychology experiments. The 
research clearly shows that implicit biases are widespread.203 It also 
shows that implicit biases affect behavior and judgments that are 
closely related to employment decisions, such as the amount of eye 
contact an interviewer makes with a job candidate.204 Research also 
indicates that implicit biases produce disparities in judgments in 
hypothetical cases by doctors and even judges.205 It also shows that 
implicit bias affects behavior in a realistic simulation, as in the 
shooter bias study.206 But there remains no study that connects the 
presence of implicit biases to actual employment decisions made in 
the real world. To be sure, other studies carefully document the 
existence of racial disparities in how job candidates are treated by 
actual employers.207 These studies lack measures of implicit biases, 
however, so the connection remains to be made.  
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 Drawing upon several lines of argument, we contend that a close 
analysis of the 2008 campaign documents some influence of 
unconscious bias on voters’ decisions. We start by reviewing evidence 
that implicit bias affects voting in general. We then present an 
analysis of the political landscape that Candidate Obama faced, 
drawing from reviews and discussions of the early months of his 
candidacy. We then assess poll numbers from the primary election to 
review how he successfully navigated this landscape. Finally, we 
present an assessment of whether the so-called “Bradley Effect” and 
the role it may have played in the 2008 election can be taken as 
evidence of the role of implicit bias among the electorate. We contend 
that the complete portrait shows a widespread influence of implicit 
bias in the 2008 election. 
 We recognize that this conclusion seems ironic. After all, 
Candidate Obama landed the job for which he was applying and 
would have no claim under Title VII. But unlike most job applicants, 
Candidate Obama had armies of people working to help him obtain 
the position. More importantly, he had a professional staff of well-
funded campaign managers to help him navigate the landscape of 
implicit bias in the electorate. To the extent his candidacy lays out a 
blueprint for successfully navigating implicit racial bias, it reveals 
the existence and influence of this bias.  
1.   Unconscious Bias and Voting in General 
 It is reasonably clear that implicit bias can influence voters. 
Voting is not based solely on the deductive, deliberative system of 
reasoning; intuition and emotion play significant roles in voter 
choice.208 In one study involving a choice of candidates, for example, 
the emotional responses to candidates accurately predicted voter 
preferences for more than 90% of the decided voters and 80% of the 
undecided voters.209 Spin doctors seem to know this. Most political 
advertisements are meant either to inspire voter enthusiasm, 
thereby motivating their political engagement and loyalty, or to 
induce fear, thereby stimulating vigilance against the risks some 
candidate supposedly poses.210 Other research shows that political 
advertisements that provoke anxiety stimulate attention toward the 
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campaign and discourage reliance on habitual cues for voting; in 
short, they can induce crossover voting.211
 Likeability also affects voting. In one study, disengaged voters 
who watched entertainment-oriented talk show interviews of Al Gore 
and George W. Bush were more likely to vote against their party 
loyalties when they found the crossover candidate likeable.212
Accordingly, politicians prime (that is, use subtle, if not subliminal, 
messages) exposed and attentive voters to base their voting decisions 
on issues and images emphasized during the campaign.213 Thus, 
candidates have an incentive to use arguments that evoke emotions 
such as fear, anxiety, and anger. Such emotional appeals allow 
politicians to galvanize their base and attract uncommitted voters’ 
support. Moreover, the use of emotionally evocative appeals is 
consistent with the media’s desire for excitement and drama in their 
reporting.214 It is no surprise that such appeals influence voting 
patterns, inasmuch as people’s implicit attitudes affect how they 
vote.215 Emotion is clearly not a panacea for candidates. Politically 
astute voters were not influenced by the extent to which they found 
the candidates likeable.216 As with most decisions, both passion and 
reason influence voting. All candidates must win the hearts and 
minds of the voters—and the hearts are probably more important. 
2.   Walking the Racial Tightrope 
 Candidate Obama faced the daunting task of winning hearts and 
minds that all candidates face. He also faced complex racial 
challenges, particularly early on in the campaign, that other 
candidates did not. As noted earlier, white voters seemed to wonder 
whether candidate Obama was “too black.”217 At the same time, many 
leaders in the black community openly wondered whether he was   
“black enough?”218 On the one hand, candidate Obama married a 
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black woman, lived in a predominantly black neighborhood, and 
attended a predominantly black church. Two issues seem to have 
raised the question in the minds of potential black voters, however.219
Blacks were initially not sure that Obama had the same experiences 
as them since he was the child of an interracial union and had grown 
up in Indonesia and Hawaii.220 Politically, black voters were also 
suspicious of a black presidential candidate who seemed to have such 
cachet with whites. They wondered what kinds of compromises a 
black candidate would have to make to be elected.221 Many black 
leaders worried that Obama could only be as black as white voters 
would allow him to be.222 In contrast, Hillary Clinton built strong 
support early in the black community based, in part, on her 
husband’s popularity among black voters.223 Oddly enough, being 
black had the potential to put candidate Obama at an early 
disadvantage among black voters, even as he also had to become 
appealing to white voters. 
 In addition to having his racial authenticity questioned, Obama 
was handicapped by the fact that at least some black voters did not 
believe he had a realistic chance of winning the November election. 
Democratic activist Donna Brazile, a black woman who was Al Gore’s 
2000 campaign manager, noted that black voters were pessimistic 
about whether the country was ready for a black president.224 Some 
blacks believed that when push came to shove, “they” (“they” being 
anyone, maybe “the Republican smear machine,” the FBI, or the CIA) 
would not let Obama win.225 Other blacks, including Senator Obama’s 
wife, feared that he would be placed in harm’s way.226 Some went so 
far as to fear that Obama would be assassinated and that not voting 
for him was a way to protect him.227
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 White voter support for Obama was complicated from the start. 
Unlike previous black candidates, Obama enjoyed real success among 
white voters. He won in Iowa and came close to winning in New 
Hampshire, even though both states have only tiny black 
populations.228 Even in South Carolina, the heart of the old South, 
Obama attracted large percentages of white votes.229 Furthermore, 
Obama achieved his unprecedented ability to raise money from the 
grassroots with considerable support from white donors. 
 Views on the sources and meaning of Obama’s success among 
whites were mixed in the early stages of his campaign. Some argued 
that Gallop and Newsweek polls showing that Americans stated that 
they would support a black President reflected a new reality and that 
white voters now look beyond race.230 Others argued that enough 
Americans were still preoccupied by race that Obama faced an uphill 
struggle to capture enough white votes to succeed in a national 
election.231 Lurking beneath Obama’s success in early primaries was 
evidence that support among many whites was weaker than it 
seemed.232 Even as Obama did well among whites in South Carolina, 
he did far worse among whites there than he did in Iowa and New 
Hampshire.233 Furthermore, as we discuss below, other black 
candidates have found that white support in the polls sometimes has 
a symbolic quality that erodes fast when it comes time to vote.234
Whites sometimes give pollsters responses they perceive to be 
politically correct but act on different impulses in the voting booth.235
 Even white voters who would ultimately vote for Obama were not 
necessarily engaged in a race-neutral focus on his qualities as a 
candidate, relative to Senator Clinton. Psychologists have long found 
that many white Americans are somewhat well aware of their own 
prejudices and those of the society in which they live and find facing 
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these biases an unpleasant experience.236 They react by engaging in 
actions designed to quell the uncomfortable sense that they and their 
peers are biased. Senator Obama could benefit from the “aversive 
racism” that many Americans feel, making his race an advantage 
among white voters. A white voter who supports Obama does not 
necessarily want a black man to be president but might only want to 
be able to congratulate himself or herself for backing a black person. 
As Bruce Llewellyn, Colin Powell’s cousin, told The New Yorker
magazine, “whites love the idea that, ‘[g]ee, we weren’t prejudiced.’ ”237
 Obama had been careful to avoid using America’s racial legacy 
against white voters. In doing so, according to Shelby Steele, Obama 
granted whites the benefit of the doubt that they are decent 
Americans who are not racists. In return for this gift, many whites 
openly embraced Obama and gave him a fair chance to make his case 
for his candidacy.238 Obama’s race “can implicitly encourage [white 
voters] to feel that a vote for Obama is a vote for tolerance, for a 
future free of the constricting prejudices of the past . . . .”239 If a black 
man can attain this nation’s highest office—largely with the support 
of white voters—maybe our nation finally judges people “on the basis 
of the content of his character rather than the color of his skin.”240
Whites would like to believe that the nation is breaking free of racial 
prejudice, and Senator Obama’s successful presidential campaign 
allows them to do that.241 In essence, Senator Obama cast himself as 
a bridge over the troubled waters of race relations to a post-racial 
America. At least a certain segment of white voters supported him 
because of that. During his Philadelphia “race speech,” however, he 
disabused whites of this notion. He pointedly noted that resolving 
America’s race problem was a collective responsibility.242 And 
arguably, he paid a price for this assertion; he fared poorly among 
white voters in the primaries that followed this speech. 
 The results in the spring primaries suggest that the disaffection of 
working-class whites for the Democratic Party’s close association 
with black voters continues to affect national politics. Even though 
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Senator Obama embraced more progressive positions than Senator 
Clinton on issues of importance to working-class voters (such as free 
trade), she consistently attracted more support from these voters 
than he did.243 These voters might see Senator Obama as more 
supportive of affirmative action than Senator Clinton, or see her as 
stronger on some other issue, such as health care. Additionally, 
Senator Clinton has not engaged in the kind of race baiting that has 
characterized previous efforts of the Republican Party. She might not 
need to do so, however, as these are the same voters Karl Rove, Jesse 
Helms, the first President Bush, and Richard Nixon targeted in past 
elections with racially motivated ads. Working-class white voters 
seem inclined as Democrats on policy but as Republicans on race. 
3.   Implicit Bias and the Primary Election Part I 
 We separately assess the results of the Democratic primary 
election from the general election and also separately provide a 
secondary analysis of the accuracy of the polls in the primary election 
as evidence of the “Bradley Effect.” The Democratic primary remains 
of interest since, unlike the general election, it provides a comparison 
of two candidates with similar political views. In assessing the 
primaries, we are mindful that Senator Clinton made history by 
almost becoming the first woman to capture the Presidential 
nomination of a major political party. IAT studies show that most 
adults more closely associate women with home life and men with 
careers,244 which certainly might have affected Senator Clinton’s 
candidacy. Our analysis tries to focus on the role race played and the 
racial subtext of the campaign, but gender likely mattered as well. 
 If implicit bias affects voters, one would expect that, at a 
minimum, those who harbor negative associations with blacks would 
tend to oppose a black candidate. Democratic primary/caucus exit 
polls indicate that Senator Obama had problems with white voters 
during the primaries. As Table 1 shows, in twenty-seven out of 
thirty-seven primaries or caucuses for which exit poll data was 
available, Senator Clinton beat Senator Obama among white 
voters.245 Asian and Latino Americans, who also express implicit 
preferences for whites over blacks on the IAT (albeit to a lesser 
                                                                                                                                       
 243. Christi Parsons & John McCormick, Blue-Collar Vote Tough for Obama: Group 
More Likely to Give Clinton Edge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2008, at 1. 
 244. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 131, at 15-17. 
 245. See MSNBC.com, 2008 Primary Results—Exit Polls, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660890; The Washington Post, Primaries and Caucuses, 
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that Table 1 reports only those states in which we had data available from both black and 
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extent than whites)246 also voted for Senator Clinton in higher 
numbers in eight out of eleven of those primaries/caucuses for which 
data are available.247 Demographic groups that tend to harbor more 
implicit anti-black bias also favored Senator Clinton. Those who 
voted for Clinton over Obama tended to be older,248 poorer,249 and less 
educated250 than Senator Obama’s supporters.  
 The disparity between black and white voters in the Democratic 
primaries was astonishing. As illustrated in Table 1, the exit polls 
show that black voters overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama, 
especially as the primary season progressed. With the exception of 
Senator Clinton’s state of New York, black voters’ support did not 
depend much on geography, never falling below 72%, and usually far 
exceeding that. But support among white voters varied enormously. 
In every state, Senator Obama garnered more support from Black 
voters than white voters. In fact, nowhere was the shift in support—
the “race gap”—less than a forty-seven-percentage point swing 
(which occurred in South Carolina). That means that the percentage 
of black voters who supported Senator Obama minus the percentage 
of black voters who supported Senator Clinton was at least forty-
seven points greater than the percentage of white voters who 
supported Senator Obama minus the percentage who supported 
Senator Clinton. At the most extreme, voters in Alabama, Arkansas, 
New Jersey, Louisiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania shifted by more than 
100 percentage points. In these States, black and white voters 
behaved practically as mirror images of each other.  
                                                                                                                                       
 246. Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130, at 958. 
 247. Parks & Roberson, Michelle Obama, supra note 9, at 26. 
 248. In twenty-seven out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of eighteen to 
twenty-four year-olds voted for Obama, whereas in twenty-five out of thirty-eight states, a 
greater percentage of seniors age sixty-five and older voted for Clinton. Parks & Roberson, 
supra note 9, at 42-43. 
 249. In nineteen out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of individuals who 
earned less than $50,000 voted for Clinton, whereas in twenty-four out of thirty-eight 
states, a greater percentage of individuals who earned more than $100,000 voted for 
Obama. Id.
 250. In twenty-six out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of individuals who 
had only a high school education voted for Clinton, whereas in twenty-eight out of thirty-
eight states, a greater percentage of individuals who had some post-graduate study voted 
for Obama. Id.
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Table 1: Exit Poll Results for Spring Primaries by Race; % Supporting Each 
Candidate251
State 






Obama Clinton Obama Clinton 
January Primaries / Caucuses 
Iowac 72 16 33 27 50 2.1 O 
Nevadac 83 14 34 52 77 6.8 C 
South 
Carolina 78 19 36 24 47 29.5 O 
Super Tuesday Primaries / Caucuses 
Alabama 84 15 25 72 106 26 O 
Arizona 79 12 38 53 82 3.1 C 
Arkansas 74 25 16 79 112 15.7 C 
California 78 18 45 46 61 6.7 C 
Connecticut 74 24 48 49 51 9.1 O 
Delaware 86 9 40 56 83 19.2 O 
Georgia 88 11 43 53 87 28.7 O 
Illinois 93 5 57 41 62 15.1 O 
Massachusetts 66 29 40 58 55 5.4 C 
Missouri 84 15 39 57 87 11.2 O 
New Jersey 82 14 31 66 113 13.6 C 
New York 61 37 37 59 46 15.9 C 
Tennessee 77 22 26 67 96 16.4 C 
Mid-February Primaries / Caucuses 
Louisiana 86 13 30 58 101 32.5 O 
Maryland 84 15 42 52 79 27.9 O 
Virginia 90 10 52 47 65 19.6 O 
Wisconsin 91 8 54 45 74 5.7 O 
March Primaries / Caucuses 
Ohio 87 13 34 64 104 11.5 C 
Texas 84 16 44 54 78 11.5 C 
Mississippi 84 15 39 57 87 36.3 O 
April-June Primaries / Caucuses 
Pennsylvania 90 10 37 63 106 10 C 
Indiana 89 11 60 40 58 8.4 C 
North 
Carolina 91 7 61 37 60 21.6 O 
Kentucky 90 7 23 72 132 7.3 C 
                                                                                                                                       
 251. See 2008 Primary Exit Polls, supra note 245. Each state’s results can be accessed 
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* Refers to the voting within race minus the cross race voting (% of black support for 
Obama minus white support for Obama plus white support for Clinton minus black 
support for Clinton). 
C Caucus; all others are primaries.
 Black voters are more complicated, as we discuss below. Black 
voters overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama throughout the 
campaign, despite early concerns about whether he was authentically 
black. Black Americans show greater variability in the results of the 
race-IAT than other races, but between 32 and 65% of blacks favor 
whites on the IAT.252 Thus, the data here are mixed. The fact that 
black Americans express far less pro-white favoritism on the IAT 
suggests that they would be more likely to support candidate Obama 
than other races. The IAT data, however, does not predict the degree 
of overwhelming support from black voters that candidate Obama 
ultimately enjoyed.  
4.   Implicit Bias and the Primary Election Part II: The “Bradley 
Effect” 
 The 2008 election featured the vigorous debate in the media over 
the existence of the “Bradley Effect.” The Bradley Effect refers to the 
tendency for the last-minute polls (and sometimes exit polls) to 
overestimate voter support for the black candidate in an election 
between a black and a white candidate. The moniker comes from the 
1982 California governor’s race that pitted Los Angeles Mayor 
Thomas Bradley, a black Democrat, against Attorney General George 
Deukmejian, a white Republican. Bradley’s election would have made 
him the first black American to be elected governor in the United 
States,253 but Bradley lost the close election. Race was clearly not the 
only factor in Bradley’s loss. An outpouring of conservative voters 
bent on defeating a gun control referendum might also have been  
a factor.254
 Issues and the factors that influence voter turnout play a role in 
any election, but the polling data suggested that race played a role in 
Bradley’s defeat. Throughout the race, Bradley had led Deukmejian 
by six to ten points in the Field Poll (the local version of the Gallup 
                                                                                                                                       
 252. Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130, at 958; John J. Jost et al., A Decade of 
System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious 
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Poll).255 Bradley led by 14% in a poll published just one month before 
the voting.256 The final Field Poll gave Bradley 48% and a seven-point 
lead. Yet, Bradley lost by one percentage point, 49 to 48%,257 a defeat 
by 52,295 votes out of 7.5 million.258 This was the only major error in 
a final Field Poll in its fifty-year history.259
 The error in the Field poll suggests that some voters might have 
been unwilling to reveal their racial preferences. They might simply 
have lied to pollsters about their choice, producing a gap between poll 
numbers and actual results. Alternatively, the variations between 
the polling results and the actual voting might reflect last-minute 
changes of heart. In fact, virtually all of the undecided white 
Democrats and Independents broke for the GOP candidate.260 At the 
last minute, in the privacy of the voting booth, a number of whites 
simply could not pull the lever to elect a black man as governor.261
 Seven years after Bradley’s bid to become the first black governor, 
L. Douglas Wilder claimed that title when he beat J. Marshall 
Coleman, a white Republican, for Virginia’s governorship. Wilder 
defeated Coleman by garnering slightly more than half of the 1.78 
million votes cast.262 Although Wilder won and the capital of the 
former Confederate States seated the nation’s first black governor, 
the election’s results were, like those in California, at odds with pre-
election polls conducted in the final week of the campaign.263 Polling 
data had found that Wilder had been between four and fifteen 
percentage points ahead of Coleman.264 Because Wilder was leading 
in every public and private poll, most experts argued that Coleman 
made up the difference with a surge in the final days of the 
election.265 But the Virginia race added a new twist to the Bradley 
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Effect. The exit poll surveys suggested that Wilder would win by 
about ten points. In effect, a full 10% of the voters in the exit poll 
reported that they had voted for the black candidate immediately 
after they had cast their ballot for the white candidate.  
 The election of David Dinkins as Mayor in New York City during 
the same election cycle produced a similar phenomenon. In 1989, 
Dinkins, a black Democrat, ran against Rudolph Giuliani, a white 
Republican, in the New York mayoral race. New York City voters 
elected Dinkins, their first-ever black mayor.266 But on Election Day, 
the media started the day reporting results of pre-election public 
opinion polls that gave Dinkins a double-digit lead over Giuliani. Exit 
polls in New York suggested that Dinkins would win by at least six to 
ten points267—possibly even as many as fourteen to twenty-one.268
Just as in the Wilder-Coleman race, however, pre-election polls 
greatly overstated Dinkins’ lead; Dinkins won by a much narrower 
margin than polls had shown.269 In the end, Dinkins polled 50% to 
Rudolph Giuliani’s 48%.270 Pollsters groped for explanations for the 
closer-than-predicted margins, and some offered a simple answer: 
Survey respondents lied, or they changed their minds from black to 
white in the privacy of the voting booth.271
 To some, the influence of the Bradley Effect on the elections in 
New York and Virginia in 1989 bore the taint of insidious and deep-
seated racial prejudice.272 If the voters did not intend to pick the 
black candidate, why lie to the pollsters? The answer lies in how 
subtle racism can be. Those who might have lied in post-election 
surveys would deny they are prejudiced; they know it is publicly 
unacceptable to appear to make decisions on the basis of race. The 
mindset of some voters may have best been captured in the comment 
of a white voter in the Bronx, “I like Giuliani. He looks good. He’s 
white like me.”273 For others, as political scientist Larry Sabato 
stated, “It’s socially acceptable to vote for a black candidate . . . 
Whites tell pollsters ahead of time that they are voting for the black 
candidate, and then they go into the voting booth and can’t quite pull 
down that lever.”274
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 More controlled survey research supports the existence of the 
Bradley Effect. A study by Berinsky demonstrates that voters are 
reluctant to express preferences concerning racially polarizing issues 
for fear of appearing racist.275 In his study, voters who privately 
opposed school integration were unwilling to express their opposition 
publicly.276 Rather than say they were opposed to integration, voters 
sought race-neutral principles to express their opposition—
responding with “I don’t know.” Though the results from the 1989 
data may be different in type from the school integration results in 
the study, Berinsky notes that they are similar in kind. In both cases, 
the “no opinion” result seemed to be a cover—for at least a significant 
proportion of the sample—for opposition to policies and candidates in 
choices that are racially sensitive. Whites who are apprehensive 
about voting for black candidates simply “vacate the field” in pre-
election polls; they declare themselves undecided rather than come 
out and say that they oppose a black candidate.277 In this study, 
“[t]his similarity between the school integration results and the 1989 
pre-election poll results carrie[d] over to a simulation that predicts 
respondent’s candidate choice.”278
 Many pollsters have argued that the lack of a Bradley Effect in 
the more recent Senatorial races in North Carolina and Tennessee 
suggests either that the phenomenon is a thing of the past, or that it 
was the product of over-interpreting statistical noise in a few selected 
elections. The spring primaries, however, produced both evidence of 
the effect and evidence of how it is evolving.  
 The first primary of the spring season produced a Bradley Effect. 
Before voting in New Hampshire, polls had Senator Obama leading 
Senator Clinton by roughly twelve points in the State.279 But like Los 
Angelinos before them, New Hampshire voters flinched at the last 
minute and would not admit as much to the pollsters. To be sure, some 
commentators denied that the Bradley Effect was at work in New 
Hampshire and cited alternative explanations.280 The polls were 
conducted before Clinton moved voters by tearing up in a diner and 
before she had a successful debate.281 Furthermore, many independent 
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voters “who told pollsters before the election they planned to vote for 
Obama but then voted for Republican John McCain because Obama 
was so far ahead they believed he would win easily.”282
 Although other factors could have had some effect in the polling 
miscue, substantial evidence supports the idea that the Bradley 
Effect played a role. First, the small residue of undecided voters and 
small number of independent voters who switched to McCain cannot 
account for the thirteen-point shift between the final polls and the 
actual results. Second, as was the case with the Wilder election, the 
exit polls were consistent with previous polls; voters clearly lied to 
pollsters both before and after they had voted.283 These factors have 
led many commentators to conclude that the Bradley Effect 
influenced the outcome in New Hampshire.284
 As Table 2 shows below, the Bradley Effect took a different turn 
as the primaries proceeded.285 The erosion of the support for Senator 
Obama between the final polls and the actual electoral results was 
most robust in primary states with black populations under 7%: 
California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. By 
contrast, polls were basically accurate in states with black 
populations near the national black population of 12.8%: Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. A reverse Bradley Effect—
whereby pollsters underestimated support for Senator Obama—
occurred in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, all of which have a 19% or higher black 
population.286 Missouri seemed slightly out of place in this trend, as 
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its population is only 11% black, and it expressed a slight reverse 
Bradley Effect, but the effect was small. Of the eighteen states with 
open primaries and available data, only Wisconsin was inconsistent 
with the trend. States with small black populations expressed the 
Bradley Effect; states with large black populations expressed the 
reverse Bradley Effect. 
Table 2: Pre-Election Overestimate of Support for Senator Obama by State* 
State 
Percentage point 
Overestimate of Obama’s 
Support** 
% Black in Population 
States Showing a Bradley Effect 
New Hampshire + 11  0.7 
California + 11  6.7 
Massachusetts  + 8  5.4 
Rhode Island   + 8  4.5 
States in Which Polls Were Accurate 
Ohio + 3 11.5 
New Jersey  + 2 13.6 
Texas  + 2 11.5 
Illinois  + 1 15.1 
Tennessee  0 16.4 
Indiana  - 4  8.4 
States Showing a Reverse Bradley Effect 
Missouri  - 6 11.2 
North Carolina  - 6 21.6 
Mississippi  - 7 36.3 
Virginia - 10 19.6 
Wisconsin - 13  5.7 
Alabama - 15 26.0 
South Carolina - 17 29.5 
Georgia - 17 28.7 
* The Table includes only the eighteen states with open primaries on which sufficient 
data were available. 
** Positive numbers indicate that the polls overestimated support for Obama; negative 
numbers indicate that the polls underestimated support.  
 Although evidence is unclear as to exactly how this unusual 
polling pattern emerged, the pattern is consistent with the idea that 
voters rely on both intuitive/emotional and deductive/rational 
systems of judgment to decide how to cast their ballots. White 
Democratic voters could convince themselves to vote for Senator 
Obama in a rational, deductive way. Democrats who vote in the 
primaries tend to be more liberal than the average voter and are 
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likely closer to Senator Obama’s policy positions than Senator 
Clinton’s more moderate positions. But these factors represent 
rational reasons to vote for a candidate. Even though candidate 
Obama’s positions were closer to those of most Democrats who vote in 
primaries than candidate Clinton’s and even though candidate 
Obama largely refrained from raising overtly black issues, he is still 
visibly black: he looks black, has a black family, and attends a black 
church. When pollsters ask voters how they have voted, they are 
somewhat embarrassed at having relied on their baser instincts and 
state that they voted for Senator Obama. Hence, when white voters 
dominate the electorate, the Bradley Effect emerges. 
 Black voters had almost the opposite perspective on Senator 
Obama’s candidacy, especially early on. Black voters also tend to be 
more liberal than the average voter and hence also embrace views 
closer to Senator Obama’s positions than Senator Clinton’s. But many 
black Americans deeply believed that a black candidate could not win 
the Presidency. And black Americans support Democrats in national 
elections in overwhelming numbers. Thus, to a large segment of black 
voters, it might rationally have seemed better to support Senator 
Clinton in hopes of having a better chance of having a Democrat win in 
the general election. But the emotional allure of voting for a viable 
black candidate—something many black Americans thought that they 
would never see—could have led to an impulsive move in the voting 
booth. Thus, when the electorate includes large numbers of black 
voters, they elevate the support at the booth exceeds estimates based 
on what they had told pollsters. In effect, many black and white voters 
had opposite instincts, rationally supporting one candidate up until 
their emotional sides overtook them in the end, thereby producing 
opposite tendencies in the elections.  
 The results from the caucuses support this thesis as well. Unlike 
elections, caucuses require a public vote. Thus they do not allow for 
voting for a white candidate in private while announcing support for 
the black candidate in public. Senator Obama did better among white 
voters in caucuses than in primaries. Like the evidence that white 
voters lie in exit interviews, Senator Obama’s strength in caucuses 
suggests that some white voters confront a last-minute tendency to 
flinch at the idea of voting for a black man. Further, they are 
sufficiently embarrassed at this instinct that they lie about it in exit 
polls in conventional elections and suppress this tendency when 
forced to vote in public in caucuses.287
 The 2008 Democratic Primary thus produced results that are 
thoroughly influenced by race. The divergence between black and 
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white voters was enormous and thorough. Black voters 
overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama at the polls. White voters 
were more mixed, but many states saw Senator Clinton winning by 
huge margins of thirty points or more. So thorough was the influence 
of race that it even produced muddled reactions to inquiries by 
pollsters that likely reflected the difficult reconciliation of egalitarian 
social norms with emotional internal reactions.  
5.   The General Election: A Surprise Ending  
 The polling numbers in the general election witnessed a 
surprising absence of the effects of implicit bias. State by state, the 
polls were largely accurate.288 The combined Bradley and reverse 
Bradley Effects did not emerge as they had in the primaries. Black 
voters overwhelmingly supported Obama, but Obama won among 
white voters in nineteen states.289
 Some predictable demographics related to voting behavior in the 
general election as well. Younger voters overwhelmingly voted for 
Obama.290 Nationally, Obama received 66% of the votes from voters 
ages eighteen to twenty-nine, while McCain received only 32%. 
McCain carried the majority of votes from senior voters (age sixty-
five and above).291  Education did not provide a reliable predictor, 
although McCain did slightly better among less well-educated white 
voters.292 Traditional political divisions influenced the general 
election. Those who earned less than $50,000 a year more likely 
voted for Obama, while those who earned more than $100,000 a year 
voted for McCain and Obama evenly.293 Of course, the overall pattern 
of victories in the states largely followed the breakdown of red and 
blue states from the last few national elections.  
 After a long campaign that featured some measure of racial 
subtext and a racially stratified pattern of voting in the Democratic 
primary, how is it that the November Presidential election looked 
free from the influence of race? In the words of James Carville, “it’s 
the economy, stupid!”294 Obama did well among voters who worried 
about the economy.295 Obama won twenty-seven states among voters 
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who were worried about the national economy at the time of the 
general election.296 Similarly, McCain won twenty-eight states among 
voters who were not worried about the national economy, versus four 
for Obama (the rest lack data or were too close to call).297
 Candidate Obama also surely benefited from the nature of how 
implicit bias and prejudice function in general. By the time of the fall 
campaign, Barack Obama was a genuine celebrity. He had enjoyed 
largely positive press coverage for many months, which likely meant 
that most voters had developed associations that were unique to him. 
Bias tends to operate by filling in the blanks: when whites see a black 
man in a dark alley pulling an ambiguous object out of his wallet, 
their minds tend to fill in the detail with a gun, rather than a 
harmless wallet. Upon meeting a black job candidate for the first 
time, someone who harbors negative associations with blacks will 
rely on those associations to evaluate the employee. By late August of 
2008, however, Barack Obama was no longer just a black man—he 
was Barack Obama. The constant media exposure would have 
ensured that many voters developed their own associations for just 
him alone.  
 Ironically, the long primary might have helped him enormously. 
At the outset of the primaries, voters still more closely associated 
Tony Blair (white politicians in general) with the concept of America 
than black politicians, but we doubt that this association persisted 
into the fall. Obama was certainly still a black candidate, but by 
August of 2008, he was the most well known black candidate in 
American history. Research on voters’ attitudes shows that lingering 
implicit biases remained, as some voted against him because they felt 
he was too foreign.298 But the simplest forms of bias can, and likely 
did, dissipate with familiarity. 
 Senator Obama also benefited from an unexpected political subtext. 
Every high school civics class in America teaches that as the financial 
markets plummeted during the Great Depression, a Republican 
President clung to the principle that the government should not 
intervene. Whether true or not, most Americans believe that the 
interventions of Franklin Roosevelt were essential to keeping the 
nation from outright revolution and complete collapse. The script of a 
Democrat moving the government to rescue the economy from the 
dangers of Republican-sponsored free market excess is well known. To 
his credit, candidate Obama excelled at taking advantage of the script, 
while Senator McCain seemed hesitant. The most effective single line 
                                                                                                                                       
 296. See id. at 51-246. 
 297. See id.
 298. Eric D. Knowles et al., Anti-Egalitarians for Obama? Group-Dominance 
Motivation and the Obama Vote, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 965, 967-68 (2009). 
2010]                     IMPLICIT BIAS 711 
of the campaign might have been when Obama ribbed McCain for 
halting his campaign by asserting that the President has to be able to 
manage more than one crisis at a time. It made McCain seem 
befuddled, thereby also playing off of another source of implicit 
biases—biases against the elderly.299
 As one commentator put it, “a drowning man doesn’t care what 
color the person is who throws him a life preserver.”300 To many, 
Senator Obama seemed to offer that life vest. The polls showed the 
candidates to be dead even right before the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers—the event that triggered the financial crisis of 2008-09. A 
week later, Senator Obama took the lead, never to lose it again.301
 It is important to note that implicit bias has its limits. White job 
applicants do not always get hired in preference to black applicants. 
The November results remind us somewhat of the 1970s movie 
Blazing Saddles, in which a desperately racist, but also just plain 
desperate white town in the Old West finds itself with no choice but 
to hire a black sheriff to defend itself. A National Public Radio 
interview conducted in Wisconsin, right before that state’s primary, 
illustrates the point. The interviewer asked a Republican diner 
owner whom he supported in the upcoming election. The owner 
indicated that he would vote Democratic in 2008, out of concern for 
the economy and the direction of the nation. When asked which 
candidate he would support in the primary, the owner said, “I think 
I’m going to vote for that black boy.”302 The latent racism is inherent 
in the statement, of course, but so too is the willingness to overcome 
the racism to hire someone who appeared, to that voter, to be able to 
address the nation’s problems. 
D.   Conclusion: Employment Discrimination and the 2008 Election 
 The 2008 election demonstrates why the effectiveness of Title VII 
continues to depend on taking steps to ensure that it addresses 
unconscious bias. The campaign was filled with racial subtext and 
included some explicit racism by fringe elements. It also produced 
wildly disparate voting patterns by race, especially in the primaries. 
Additionally, the primaries produced an odd, but highly reliable set 
of polling errors that suggest a lurking racial influence. This 
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influence dissipated somewhat by the fall, but the landscape that the 
2008 election presents would hardly be comforting to a black job 
candidate. The message that with a team of experts and a barrage of 
positive media exposure, you can get hired if an employer really sees 
you as uniquely valuable is not one that indicates that the nation has 
entered a post-racial phase.  
 The widespread racial polarity in voting in the primaries is as 
close as one can get to evidence of disparate impact in a unique 
situation like this. This disparate impact triggers further inquiry, 
demanding an explanation for the pattern. The general election 
resembles the Democratic-Republican split over the last few years 
and so would probably pass muster. But the primaries are harder to 
explain without reference to race. 
 Furthermore, any court assessing a Title VII claim would have to 
attend closely to the racist commentary and subtext that ran through 
the campaigns. Courts have encountered many of the explicitly racist 
references made about candidate Obama in Title VII actions and 
repeatedly held them to constitute evidence of bias.303  Many of the 
kinds of explicitly racial rhetoric, and even some of the subtexts that 
appeared in the 2008 campaign, have also appeared in Title VII 
cases: references to blacks as primates;304 imitating blacks engaging 
in “shuck-and-jive talk;”305 using the word “tar baby” on a work 
bulletin board;306 joking references to blacks enjoying fried chicken;307
associations between blacks and watermelon;308 the use of the term 
“uppity” in reference to black employees;309 implying that minorities 
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are not American enough;310 calling an employee “too ethnic” or “pro-
black;”311 and raising concerns about blacks engaging in inter-racial 
relationships.312 Courts have held that these kinds of stray remarks 
can help support a claim of discrimination when they are made by an 
actual decisionmaker313 closely in time with the employment 
decision314 in an effort to express discrimination315 and in a way that 
is related to the decisionmaking process.316 Although the major 
candidates avoided explicitly racial remarks, some of the true 
decisionmakers—the voters—indulged in such efforts in an effort to 
demean candidate Obama.  
 The reliance of courts on “stray remarks” represents a serious 
effort to begin to deal with implicit bias in employment 
discrimination. Courts historically treat such remarks as 
meaningless sophomoric humor in employment discrimination cases. 
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example, 
faced a case that was filled with highly gendered stray remarks and 
yet did not find them to be meaningful.317 These are the kinds of 
comments that “leak” from those who harbor implicit biases. 
Unconscious, anti-black bias is correlated with the use of verbal slurs 
towards blacks.318 The 2008 campaign should not, therefore, be taken 
as evidence that these comments need no longer be taken seriously. 
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Rather, the campaign itself shows how pervasive they are and how a 
job candidate must navigate them. 
IV.   CONCLUSION: POST ELECTION AND BEYOND
 Research conducted after the election suggests that President 
Obama’s success might be a misleading indicator of racial progress. 
Some voters who harbor anti-egalitarian racial views nevertheless 
cast their ballots for Obama largely to support the claim that the 
United States is now a post-racial country.319 His election might even 
facilitate backsliding on racial progress. One study demonstrates 
that individuals become more willing to describe a job as better 
suited for whites than for blacks after expressing support for 
President Obama as a presidential candidate.320 This result suggests 
that showing “support for Obama grants people moral 
credentials”321—where an individual’s track record of egalitarian 
racial views provides them with an ethical certification that later 
facilitates racially biased decisions. It is akin to hiring or promoting a 
token black employee so as to avoid implementing a more 
widespread, systematic effort to rid a workplace of bias.322 Addressing 
implicit bias at an individual level requires active cognitive and 
social effort. Belief that bias is a thing of the past might lead those 
with the desire to avoid acting on their implicit biases to let down 
their guard and might give license to those inclined to discriminate to 
carry on. 
 In the long run, President Obama’s electoral success is good news 
for American race relations, of course. Current models of prejudice 
and stereotype reduction support the view that the 2008 election will 
reduce the effect of implicit biases overall. This work reveals that 
people can help avoid the influence of implicit biases if they: 1) are 
aware of their bias; 2) are motivated to “change their responses 
because of personal values, feelings of guilt, compunction, or self-
insight;”323 and 3) possess cognitive resources needed to develop and 
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practice correction.324 The outcome of the 2008 election facilitates all 
of these factors. Exposure to high-esteemed black Americans reduces 
implicit bias, and the nation will now have at least four years of daily 
exposure to a black man occupying the highest office.325  The Obama 
Administration has also appointed other minorities to prominent 
positions (most recently, Justice Sotomayor), creating even more role 
models that are vastly contrary to stereotypes.326
 The United States has moved far from its brutal racial history, but 
it is still a work in racial progress. It is not that President Obama’s 
election ends the debate on race, as his campaign highlighted myriad 
ways in which a modern conception of racial prejudice can and must be 
understood. His election will provide a new way to think about race in 
American life. It represents an auspicious beginning to new modes of 
thinking about the role of law in helping this society reach its racial 
egalitarian ideals. But it is still only the beginning of a new era. 
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